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Abstract
This paper presents an overview of the results of a research project on monetary transmission
pursued by the Eurosystem, which has analyzed micro data on  rms and banks in several
countries of the euro area in great detail. There is strong empirical support for an interest rate
channel working through  rm investment. Furthermore, a credit channel can be identi ed
with  rm micro data. On the bank side, there is evidence that lending reacts differently to
monetary policy according to bank balance sheet characteristics.In particular, banks that have
a less liquid asset composition show a stronger loan supply response.This  ndingmay be due
to banks drawing on their liquid assets to cushion the effects of monetary policy on their loan
portfolio, which is in line with the existence of close relationships between banks and their
loan customers. (JEL: C23, E52, G21)
1. Introduction
The European Monetary Union (EMU) constitutes a new currency area with a
common monetary policy. To successfully conduct monetary policy in this new
environment, it is of crucial importance to understand the monetary transmission
process to the best possible extent. Since the member countries are characterized
by marked differences both in the real and the  nancial sector, it is possible that
the size as well as the dynamics of monetary policy effects differ among
countries. These issues have recently been addressed in research projects in-
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volving the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of the
euro area (NCBs).1 This paper gives an overview of the microeconometric
results (for the macroeconometric evidence see van Els et al. 2003, this volume).
Micro data can be usefully employed to gain a more in-depth understanding
of monetary policy transmission and the possible relevance of heterogeneity.
The research project used data on  rms and on banks from several euro area
countries, focusing mainly on two channels of monetary transmission.2 The  rst
is the interest rate channel to  rm investment via the cost of capital; the second
is the credit channel, which relies on capital market imperfections due to
informational asymmetries. Unlike the transmission through the interest rate
channel, the existence of a credit channel implies that borrowers with a limited
access to  nancial markets should be more responsive to changes in monetary
conditions. This asymmetry exists if external  nance premia—caused by the
existence of information asymmetries—are affected by monetary policy to a
different degree across economic agents: those that suffer more from informa-
tion asymmetry problems experience a stronger increase of this premium
following a monetary policy tightening. The credit channel theory distinguishes
two subchannels that can cause such an asymmetric reaction: the balance sheet
channel and the bank lending channel.3 The  rst one focuses on the effects
monetary policy has on borrowers’ (5 rms’) external  nance premia by alter-
ing their balance sheets (especially the value of their collateral). The second
regards the effects of monetary policy on the lenders’ (5banks’) balance sheets
(especially the volume of deposits) and how this may in uence their loan supply
to nonbanks. It is based on the assumption that banks (which are themselves
borrowers in the  nancial market, mainly from depositors) differ in their ability
to raise alternative funds after a monetary tightening and that therefore also their
loan supply will respond differently.
Both the interest rate and the credit channel can fruitfully be analyzed with
micro data on  rms: through the large cross-sectional dimension of the datasets
analyzed, we expect to obtain more precise estimates of the cost of capital
effects on investment than studies based on macro data. Moreover, since the
credit channel predicts heterogeneous responses of  rms, it can best be tested
with disaggregated  rm data.
Since in the euro area the bulk of  nancing to  rms is supplied through
banks, the behavior of the banking sector is potentially important for monetary
1. The projects were undertaken by the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network (MTN) and
the Working Group of Econometric Modelling (WGEM). The former is a research network
established in 1999 for conducting a comprehensive and in-depth study of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism in the euro area based on both macro data and  rm-level and bank-level
micro data. The latter is a working group of modelling experts, which have assembled evidence on
the transmission mechanism based on area-wide and national structural macro-models available in
the Eurosystem. The full set of relevant papers is available as ECB Working Papers (numbers
91–114).
2. For an overview of these channels see Cecchetti (1995).
3. Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
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policy transmission. Therefore, the analysis has been extended to micro bank
level data. These may help to assess whether the credit channel effects found
with  rm data could in principle be caused by the bank lending channel or if
only the balance sheet channel is at work.
The results presented in this paper add to the literature in several dimen-
sions. They are based on two empirical approaches. One consists of individual
country analyzes with country-speci c speci cations. While this strategy has the
advantage of describing monetary policy transmission in a given country to the
best possible extent, it comes with the drawback that the heterogeneity in the
model speci cations does not allow for a direct comparability across countries.
The other strategy therefore consists of applying a harmonized estimation
approach for the four largest euro area countries in order to enable cross-country
comparisons. The data sets that have been employed are of very high quality
especially for banks, where they cover the full population, and had in many
cases not been used for empirical analyses before.
In the next section, we present the model and econometric results for  rm
investment, analyzing the cost of capital effect as well as the credit channel. In
Section 3, we report the model and the results for bank lending, where the
analysis of the credit channel is complemented with evidence on bank behavior.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Firm Investment
2.1 Data and Model
In this section, we report the results of several studies that analyze  rm
investment behavior to assess the relevance of the interest rate channel and the
credit channel. The datasets used consist of  rm balance sheet data available at
the NCBs of the euro area. The coverage is generally quite large but differs
across countries (see Table 2). The sample periods for which data are available
vary from country to country—roughly, they cover the period from the mid-
1980s to end of the 1990s.
The econometric model is derived from a standard neoclassical  rm opti-
mising framework following Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), which leads
to estimation equation (1):
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with i denoting individual  rms and t denoting time. I/K represents the invest-
ment capital ratio, Dy the sales growth rate, Duc the change in the user cost, and
CF/K the cash  ow capital ratio. The model allows for  xed effects across  rms,
as indicated by the  rm speci c intercept fi. Although alternative speci cations
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of investment have been estimated in the literature, they usually perform less
well empirically. Also, the forecasting performance of distributed lag models
are found to be better (Oliner, Rudebusch and Sichel, 1995). In addition, the
user cost elasticity is directly estimated in our model. The user cost is de ned
as the traditional Jorgensonian user cost including depreciation, interest rate
terms and relative prices.4Therefore, in case an interest channel is operative, the
coef cients on the user cost changes should be signi cant and negative. The
cash  ow ratio enters as a measure of the availability of internal funds. It has
been argued that the investment cash  ow sensitivity could also capture ex-
pected pro ts, which e.g., determines investment in q theory without  nancial
constraints rather than effects of an external funds premium. Credit channel
effects are therefore identi ed only by differences of the cash  ow coef cients
across  rms under the assumption that there are no differences among groups
of  rms in the predictive power of cash  ow for expected pro ts.5 The
identifying assumption is that  rms with a higher coef cient on cash  ow
suffer more from  nancial market imperfections. Since monetary policy
affects cash  ows, those  rms are also likely to suffer more from monetary
policy shocks. Sample comparisons using size as a discriminating charac-
teristic of this liquidity condition of  rms have been common in the
empirical literature examining the link between  nancial constraints and
investment.
Due to the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable, the models are
estimated by GMM as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). This ensures
ef ciency and consistency of the estimates, provided that instruments are
adequately chosen to take into account the serial correlation properties of the
model (which is tested for with the standard Sargan test).
2.2 Results
Model (1) has been estimated in a harmonized fashion for the four largest
countries of the euro area, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. These results are
summarized in Table 1.6 We limit ourselves to reporting only the estimated
long-run coef cients that represent the long run elasticity of the capital stock
with respect to the regressors.7
The user cost has a signi cant long run effect on the capital stock in
Germany and Italy (it is signi cant for Spain when nonsigni cant lags are
4. For details see Chatelain et al. (2001), page 36.
5. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) propose a method which allows to separate expectation
effects from  nancial effects of cash  ow.
6. See Chatelain et al. (2001).
7. The long run coef cients are calculated as the sum of the coef cients of the various lags of the
indicated variable, divided by one minus the sum of the coef cients on the lagged endogenous
variable.
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excluded and for France when cash  ow is dropped from the regression). This
provides evidence for an operative interest rate channel in these countries. Cash
 ow is signi cant in all countries.
The results presented in Table 1 have been put to more detailed testing for
France, Germany, and Italy, and similarly for other countries of the euro area in
a set of companion papers. We provide a qualitative overview of their results in
Table 2.
All studies  nd signi cant negative long run user cost elasticities, providing
strong evidence for an operative interest channel in the whole euro area. Some
studies test if different  rm characteristics can explain differences in user cost
sensitivity. Although no such characteristics can be identi ed for German and
French  rms, in the case of Italy small  rms and  rms with a high share of
intangible assets have higher user cost elasticities. In Belgium, capital intensive
industries are found to be more sensitive to the user cost. In Luxembourg, young
 rms are found to be more sensitive. These results indicate that one can expect
TABLE 1. LONG-RUN COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATED IN MODEL (1)
France Germany Italy Spain
Sales 0.12** 0.39** 0.14** 0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
User cost 20.03 20.52** 20.20** 20.28
(0.04) (0.15) (0.06) (0.20)
Cash  ow 0.20** 0.08** 0.30** 0.15**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Notes: ** denotes signi cance at the 5%/1% level. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE 2. ESTIMATION RESULTS OF FIRM STUDIES FOR SINGLE COUNTRIES
Model speci cation Results: relevant  rm characteristics
Sample
period
No. of
obs Highest user cost sensitivity Highest liquidity sensitivity
Austria 1994–1999 2652 — Firms with no close
relationship to a house
bank
Belgium 1986–1998 157547 Capital intensive industries Small services,
manufacturing
France 1986–1999 61237 — Equipment manufacturing,
 rms with bad credit
rating
Germany 1988–1997 44345 — Firms with bad credit rating
Italy 1984–1999 43912 Small  rms,  rms with
high share of intangible
assets
Small  rms,  rms with high
share of intangible assets
Luxembourg 1992–1998 517 Young  rms Young  rms
Source: Austria: Valderrama (2001); Belgium: Butzen, Fuss, and Vermeulen (2001); France: Chatelain and Tiomo
(2001); Germany: von Kalckreuth (2001); Italy: Gaiotti and Generale (2001); Luxembourg: Lu¨nnemann and Matha¨
(2001).
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most  rms in the euro area to react to interest rate changes, although not to the
same extent.
Table 2 also provides an overview of the effect of liquidity on investment.8
No single criterion according to which  rms are more sensitive to liquidity is
found to be relevant in all countries. For example, size in itself does not seem
to be suf cient to capture the presence of differences in external  nance premia.
However, all criteria that are relevant in individual countries point towards  rms
with less potential to provide adequate collateral. We take these differences
of liquidity sensitivity to be indicative of potential credit channel effects. For
instance, in both France and Germany,  rms with a bad credit rating show
a higher cash  ow sensitivity. In Italy and Belgium, small  rms are more
sensitive to cash  ow. Also, particular industries could be more vulnerable
to credit channel effects. Small services  rms in Belgium and equipment
manufacturers in France are found to be more liquidity sensitive. For
Austria,  rms without a close relationship to a house bank show a higher
liquidity sensitivity.
These results suggest that the interest rate channel is operative in the euro
area. They do furthermore point to internal funds as a crucial determinant of
 rms’ investment, with an effect that is stronger for those  rms that are more
likely to face  nancial constraints, so that the credit channel is also operative.
3. Bank Lending
3.1 Data and Model
The complementary studies of bank lending behavior use bank balance sheet
data collected by the NCBs of the euro area that are available at least on a
quarterly basis and cover the full population of banks in the respective coun-
tries.9 The sample periods for which data are available differ from country to
country—they do roughly cover the 1990s, though, thus restricting the analysis
in most cases to pre EMU (see Table 4 for details). Since bank-individual
interest rates on loans are not available for all countries in a suf cient quality,
the analysis focuses on loan quantities. The econometric model is a reduced
form of a simple model of the loan and deposit market (for details see Ehrmann
et al. 2001):
8. The Austrian and Luxembourg study did not use cash  ow but the cash stock as their liquidity
measure.
9. Prior research in this area (e.g., Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi 1999; DeBondt 1999) has usually
employed commercially compiled datasets like BankScope, which cover only a fraction of the
banking population, at an annual frequency. Ehrmann et al. (2001) provide a comparative analysis,
showing that these data cannot in general replicate the  ndings of the more comprehensive
datasets.
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where Lit are the loans of bank i in quarter t to the private non- nancial sector,
Drt represents the  rst difference of a nominal short-term interest rate (used as
measure of monetary policy), D log(GDPt) the growth rate of real GDP, and in t
the in ation rate. The model allows for  xed effects across banks, as indicated
by the bank speci c intercept ai.
xit denotes a bank speci c characteristic. Under the assumption that banks
face a homogeneous loan demand with respect to xit, loan supply effects caused
by monetary policy can be identi ed with equation (2) because the interaction
of the bank speci c characteristic with the changes in the interest rate singles out
differential reactions of bank loan supply to monetary policy.10 The usual
assumptions met in the bank lending channel literature are that a small, less
liquid or less capitalized bank11 has more problems to offset monetary policy
induced reductions in deposits. It should therefore react more strongly than a
bank with a higher value of the respective bank characteristic. This would imply
positive coef cients on the interaction terms. Size is measured by the log of total
assets. Liquidity is de ned as the ratio of liquid assets (cash, interbank lending
and securities) to total assets, and capitalization is given by the ratio of capital
and reserves to total assets. Model (2) is estimated with each of the bank
characteristics in turn, as well as once with all three characteristics simulta-
neously.12 Since the results are qualitatively equivalent, we will only present
and discuss those that are based on the simultaneous model in the subsequent
section.
3.2 Results
Like model (1), model (2) is estimated using the GMM estimator suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991). The main results for France, Germany, Italy, and
10. For some countries, it has been possible to construct bank-speci  c demand proxies (e.g.,
Worms 2001). Since such an improvement in the control for demand did not affect the results, we
are con dent that the assumption of homogeneous loan demand with respect to xit holds in general.
However, see comments on the econometric results for Spain below.
11. For size, see e.g., Kashyap and Stein (1995), for liquidity, see, e.g., Kashyap and Stein
(2000), and for capital, see, e.g., Peek and Rosengren (1995).
12. In this case, all possible combinations of the product of the bank characteristic variables are
furthermore introduced.
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Spain are summarized in Table 3.13Again, we limit ourselves to reporting only
the estimated long-run coef cients.
The long-run effects of a permanent increase in interest rates on loan growth
of an average bank (shown in the  rst row of Table 3) are estimated to be
negative in all countries, indicating that restrictive monetary policy reduces
bank lending of the average bank. The reaction differs across countries, though:
the smallest is found in Germany, the largest in France.
With respect to the interaction terms of bank characteristics with monetary
policy, size does not emerge as a useful indicator for the distributional effects
of monetary policy. It is insigni cant in all countries. Also capitalization does
not play an important role in distinguishing banks’ reactions. However, liquidity
seems to be important: more liquid banks reduce loans less in response to a
restrictive monetary policy than less liquid banks do.
The results presented in Table 3 have been put to more detailed testing in
a set of companion papers. Furthermore, there are several papers performing a
similar analysis for other countries of the euro area. Since there is no single set
of comparable parameter estimates from these papers, we provide a qualitative
overview of their results in Table 4. For Spain, a more thorough analysis shows
that the weakly signi cant effect of liquidity shown in Table 3 can be explained
by differences in the composition of banks’ loan portfolios. Furthermore, no
liquidity effects can be detected when an alternative exogenous deposit-reduc-
ing shock is analyzed. For the other countries, the evidence of Table 3 is
corroborated, however. Especially for the cases of Germany and Italy, several
robustness checks con rm that liquidity is the dominant bank characteristic
explaining lending reactions to monetary policy. The results for the other
countries studied are strikingly similar. Size is signi cant only in Greece and the
Netherlands. Portugal is the only case where loan supply effects are identi ed
without liquidity as an important variable.
13. Taken from Ehrmann et al. (2001).
TABLE 3. LONG-RUN COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATED IN MODEL (2)
France Germany Italy Spain
Monetary policy 21.97** 20.53** 20.83** 21.51**
(0.57) (0.20) (0.13) (0.43)
Real GDP 2.98** 0.08 1.39** 1.70**
(0.37) (0.14) (0.21) (0.33)
In ation 23.68** 1.66** 20.62 22.07**
(0.51) (0.28) (0.39) (0.39)
Size z Monetary Policy 20.06 20.04 0.08 20.21
(0.22) (0.04) (0.05) (0.13)
Liquidity z Monetary Policy 8.11** 3.94** 2.28** 3.99*
(1.93) (0.88) (0.83) (1.91)
Capitalization z Monetary Policy 2.30 20.47 3.62 211.30
(7.01) (5.34) (3.10) (9.11)
Notes: */** denotes signi cance at the 5%/1% level. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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These results point to a crucial role of asset liquidity, and dismiss size as an
important characteristic describing bank reaction to monetary policy. This is
surprising, since size was found to be very important in the United States, where
small banks restrict their lending by more than large banks after a monetary
tightening.14Several features of the euro area banking structure can help explain
the different  ndings.15 First, historically, the perceived risk of investing in a
small bank in the euro area may have been lower due to a higher government
involvement and fewer bank failures.16More importantly, in several countries,
banks do not stand alone in the interbank market. Especially small banks are
often organized in networks, which access the interbank market through their
head institutions. Finally, there is evidence that some (usually small) banks, in
several countries of the euro area, provide some kind of insurance to their clients
by keeping strong liquidity positions on which they draw to shelter their clients
from changes in monetary policy.
Ehrmann and Worms (2001) show that, in the context of bank networks,
small banks “park” excess liquidity with the head institutions of their bank
network in normal times, and use these liquid assets to maintain their loan
portfolio following a monetary policy tightening. Worms (2001) shows that this
intranetwork liquidity is the driving force for the dominant role of liquidity in
the German case. This enables banks to draw on their liquid assets to cushion
the effects of monetary policy on their loan portfolio, which is in line with the
existence of close relationships between banks and their loan customers.
There is only very little evidence that capitalization in uences the banks’
lending reaction. This could be due to several reasons. For example, since the
measure of capitalization we use is based on balance sheet data without taking
into account the loan portfolio structure and its risk characteristics, it could be
too crude to capture the riskiness of a bank, and is thus not indicative for the
informational asymmetry problems. It might therefore not be capturing a risk-
based measure such as the Basle capital requirement.17Alternatively, it could of
course be that capitalization is indeed not a signi cant determinant of a bank’s
reaction to monetary policy.
4. Conclusions
The empirical results summarized in this paper add up to a fairly consistent
picture of monetary transmission in the euro area. First, the interest rate channel
is operative for  rm investment in the euro area. There is also evidence that
14. See e.g., Kashyap and Stein (1995).
15. A detailed analysis is provided in Ehrmann et al. (2001).
16. See LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). Their data refer to 1995, which is
contained in the econometric sample of most studies. In the meantime, government involvement
has been reduced considerably in several countries of the euro area (see Ehrmann et al., 2001).
17. The BIS ratio measure can in most cases not be obtained from the available datasets.
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liquidity matters more for some groups of  rms, namely those that are most
likely to have limited collateral to pledge and to suffer relatively more from a
monetary policy shock. However, no single  rm characteristic, such as size, is
suf cient to delineate those groups.
Regarding the evidence obtained with bank data, banks of different size do
not react differently to monetary policy, which indicates that, due to institutional
factors in the euro area, size may not be a good proxy for the degree of
asymmetric information problems suffered by banks. Instead, their reaction to
an increase in the short-term interest rate depends strongly on their degree of
liquidity: less liquid banks reduce lending by more in response to a restrictive
monetary policy action than more liquid banks do. This lends support to the
hypothesis that banks typically draw on their liquid assets to cushion the effects
of monetary policy on their loan portfolio, which is in line with the existence of
close relationships between banks and their loan customers.
The analysis of  rm investment and bank lending has shown that there is some
evidence of an operative credit channel in the euro area. However, banks use
liquidity to buffer the effects of monetary policy on lending. This squares with the
results reported in this volume by van Els, Locarno, Mojon, and Morgan (2003),
who identify a dominant role for the interest channel with macro data.
To gain a deeper understanding of the credit channel effects, it would be
necessary to match data on borrowers and lenders. Unfortunately, this was
impossible with the data available to us.
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